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A B S T R A C T
Inexpensive WiFi-capable hardware can be nowadays easily used to capture traﬃc from end users and extract
knowledge. Such knowledge can be leveraged to support advanced services like user proﬁling, device classiﬁ-
cation. We review here the main building blocks to develop a system based on passive WiFi monitors, that is,
cheap and viable sniﬀers which collect data from end devices even without an explicit association to any Wi-Fi
network. We provide an overview of the services which can be enabled by such approach with three practical
scenarios: user localization, user proﬁling and device classiﬁcation. We evaluate the performance of each one of
the three scenarios and highlight the challenges and threats for the aforementioned systems.
1. Introduction
Recent studies on the growth rate of wireless traﬃc have predicted
that Wi-Fi traﬃc will account for more than half of total IP traﬃc by
2019, with the total public Wi-Fi hotspots growing sevenfold from 2015
to 2020, from 64.2 million in 2015 to 432.5 million by 2020 [1]. This
means that a good deal of IP traﬃc generated by end users to post on
social networks, interact with friends, get access to entertainment and
other services will go through a wireless ﬁrst-mile connection.
In this context, capturing and properly processing data from such
networks does provide a goldmine to build up value-added services. As
a matter of fact, WiFi Internet Service Providers and system integrators
are already broadening their commercial oﬀer beyond the simple pro-
vision of internet connectivity to include advanced services based on
WiFi data analytics. In such a way, commercial WiFi deployments may
be transformed into powerful tools for conducting market research and
gauging insights from customers, as WiFi traﬃc can reveal information
on ﬁrst time vs. frequent visitors at shops, customer loyalty, dwell
times, walking paths, real-time heat-maps, customer gender and age.
The aforementioned services are generally oﬀered by leveraging
either active or passive WiFi measurements. Active WiFi measurements
capture and analyze the traﬃc of end users which are associated to the
speciﬁc WiFi hot spots. Such measurements are generally very rich in
terms of available information (uplink/downlink traﬃc exchanged,
total connection time, etc.). Furthermore, they generally include the
identity of the accessing user, since the vast majority of WiFi hot spots
around the world require some type of authentication (e.g., through
captive portals). Conversely, passive measurements occur when the
data is collected from end user devices which are not associated to any
WiFi hot spots. Clearly, such measurements are generally “less in-
formative” than active ones since they are based only on WiFi man-
agement frames which are exchanged by WiFi devices regardless their
association status (e.g., association request/response, probe request/
response, etc.). Still, insightful information can be extracted from pas-
sive measurements with the clear advantage of being less intrusive (and
less expensive) than active approaches.
In this work, we showcase the potentials of leveraging passive wiﬁ
measurements to extract value-added knowledge. Namely, we focus
here on the analysis of WiFi probe request management frames, which
are broadcast by end devices to probe for available WiFi hot spots.
Starting from the availability of millions of probe request frames, we
provide three diﬀerent contributions: (i) we propose a thorough ana-
lysis of localization-based services built on top of probe request frames;
(ii) we propose a method to identify groups of people having similar
behaviors in the way they visit a particular area and (iii) we show how
to leverage the information contained into probe request frames to
automatically detect if the sending device is a smartphone or a laptop,
an information that can be used to optimize the network conﬁguration
and/or implement services such as management of wide WiFi network
or smart content caching approaches.
Referring to the ﬁrst contribution, only very recently some attention
has been given to the problem of exploiting probe request frames to
localize users in a passive way. The majority of the works in this area
focus on creating location-based heat maps or to track mobile users in a
coarse way, rather than focusing on ﬁne-grained localization.
Diﬀerently, we try to push the localization accuracy of systems based on
probe request frames to its limit and we evaluate two localization
techniques based on probe request: in the ﬁrst one, we resort to
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parametric model-based triangulation approaches, whilst in the second
one we use ﬁngerprinting.
For the second contribution, we propose a set of features derived
from the analysis of probe requests capture time that are later used to
cluster the users in diﬀerent groups. We show that with our approach
groups of users with very diﬀerent behaviours can be highlighted and
separated. Moreover, we show that probe request messages can be used
to infer the geographical features of users (provenience and attitude to
travel).
As for smartphone/laptop classiﬁcation, we show that it can be be
performed by collecting (and parsing) only probe requests Wi-Fi man-
agement frames, in contrast with those systems that resort to invasive
deep packet inspection techniques to read out application layer in-
formation in the exchanged packets. Our proposed classiﬁcation fra-
mework ﬁrst characterizes each device with a set of features extracted
from the probe request frames; the reference set of feature captures
information on the temporal process of probe request transmission
(how frequently probe requests are transmitted) and the power levels
used in the probe request transmission. Then, a supervised learning
approach is used to train diﬀerent classiﬁers able to predict the type of
transmitting device just by looking at its corresponding features.
The manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a survey
on the reference literature exploiting passive measurements within
WiFi networks; Section 3 provides a quick background on WiFi active
scanning procedures and further describes the reference system set up
used to collect and analyzed the passive WiFi traces; in Section 4 we
show how to perform localization, user proﬁling and smartphone/
laptop classiﬁcation based on passive WiFi measurements. Section 5
concludes the work.
2. Background and related work
The IEEE 802.11 standard deﬁnes three types of layer-2 frames
which are exchanged among WiFi devices: control frames, management
frames, and data frames [2]. Passive measurement systems generally
leverage management frames which are exchanged by Wi-Fi enable de-
vices. Note that such devices do not need to be associated to any WiFi
access point in order to exchange management frames.
More speciﬁcally, we are interested in the management frames
transmitted by end devices during the Active Scanning phase, that is, the
phase in which they search for WiFi networks (access points) in the
surroundings to connect to. In such phase, each end device broadcasts a
probe request management frame to stimulate in-range APs to manifest
themselves (replying with a probe reply management frame). Such
probe requests are usually broadcasted in sequence on all the available
WiFi channels (1–14). The set of information which is contained in (or
can be easily extracted by) probe request frames include the Medium
Access Control (MAC) address of the sending device, the Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) out of the transmission of the frame
and the Preferred Network List (PNL), that is a list of Service Set
IDentiﬁers (SSID) of the WIFi networks which are already known by the
sending device. Fig. 1 reports the standard format of probe request
frames
Recent studies have shown that properly collecting, processing and
possibly coupling such basic information with other external data al-
lows for building up build up some knowledge on the reference popu-
lation/scenario the probe requests are collected from. The proposed
system to accomplish this process are generally composed of three main
elements: (i) a collection front-end based on WiFi-enabled hardware to
collect probe requests frames; such hardware can be composed of either
commercial Access Points or by “home-made” solutions based on low-
power embedded devices; (ii) a data processing engine which operates
on the collected data to extract the target context knowledge, and op-
tionally (iii) an external service providing side-information on the re-
ference scenario which can be coupled in the data processing phase
with the information extracted from the ﬁeld.
The available systems based on passive WiFi probes can be classiﬁed
according to the speciﬁc target information/knowledge which is ex-
tracted. Generally speaking, three broad classes can be identiﬁed in this
respect: (i) systems targeting localization and tracking of end users; (ii)
systems willing to associate a speciﬁc identity (real or cyber) to any
given captured device; and (iii) systems targeting end user proﬁling
with respect to technical and social parameters. Table 1 reports a
classiﬁcation of the reference literature with respect to the aforemen-
tioned guidelines, further distinguishing among contributions targeting
indoor and outdoor environments.
2.1. Localization and tracking
Systems of this type generally exploit the information on the RSSI
and the proximity to WiFi sensors to infer the geographical position of
end users. The work in [3] targets pedestrian ﬂow estimation across the
security check in an airport. Several non-supervised learning ap-
proaches are proposed and qualitatively compared against a proxy
measure for the ﬂows and density, that is, the number of boarding pass
scans performed at the security check at given time intervals.
Along the same lines, Fukuzaki et al. propose in [4] a pedestrian
ﬂow estimation service in shopping malls; the proposed system ﬁrst
estimates the position of a given device by leveraging the Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) out of a probe request message cap-
tured by multiple probes, and then builds up a statistical character-
ization of the users ﬂows. The proposed system is also used to count the
number of people in the reference environment, namely, the authors
use a simple linear model which returns the estimated number of people
out of the total number of perceived MAC addresses; the model is
trained against a secondary people counting system based on motion
detection sensors at the entrances of the shopping mall.
Very recently, there have been some works targeting the problem of
passive indoor localization using setups similar to the one proposed in
this paper. In [5], a system composed of eight WiFi sniﬀers is deployed
in an area of about 5000m2. A triangulation-based algorithm is used to
localize coarsely the users in eight areas of the experimental area,
however no details on the performance of the localization algorithm are
reported. In [6], twelve WiFi sniﬀers are deployed in an area of about
340m2. Fingerprint localization through k-Nearest Neighbour classiﬁer
is performed, with a reported median error of about 4.5m. The work in
[7] presents Probr, an open source software solution to capture and
process probe requests in order to support several on-line analysis tasks,
Fig. 1. Probe request frame format. Numbers represent the ﬁeld
size in bytes.
Table 1
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including localization, room utilization and people tracking. Localiza-
tion is implemented with triangulation through a RSSI-based multi-
lateration algorithm, but no results on its performance are reported.
Finally, in [8] a system based on probe requests sniﬃng and ﬁngerprint
localization with Bayesian Classiﬁer is presented. The system is tested
in an indoor area of 30m2 with 4 sniﬀers and is reported to achieve a
median localization error of about 2m. Compared to these works, we
provide a more detailed performance evaluation of both triangulation
and ﬁngerprinting-based localization on either a controlled or a rea-
listic scenario.
Rouveyrol et al. show how to leverage commercial WiFi routers to
track end users; the authors collect the results WiFi scanning procedures
performed by a single smartphone, which, coupled with the smartphone
positioning information, are used to showcase the feasibility of a large-
scale WiFi network to track end users.
Trajectory estimation and crowd-control are also addressed in [10]
and [12] with similar approaches. In [10], the authors propose an
Hidden Markov Model which returns the most probable device trajec-
tory receiving as input the WiFi detections of end devices. Bonne et al.
focus on mobility characterization at mass events.
Diﬀerently from the previous works where the WiFi sensor are
static, Chon et al. show in [9] how to use portable devices to collect
insightful information from the surrounding environment; the reference
systems is composed of 25 users with smartphones and portable devices
lingering around Seoul and capturing WiFi traﬃc; the authors then
show how to use such information to design application in the ﬁeld of
users mobility, tracking and co-location detection (two users in the
same space). In [26], a single Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is
equipped with a sniﬀer device and used to collect probe request frames
from diﬀerent positions. A classiﬁcation baed localization algorithm is
then applied to estimate the position of a user, with a reported accuracy
of 7.5m in 80% of the cases.
2.2. De-Anonymization
The works in this class aim at associating each device to a speciﬁc
end user, either a physical person or a cyber-physical avatar. In [14],
WiFi passive probes are used to showcase the vulnerability of current
WiFi procedures with respect to the stalker attack attack where a stalker
physically follows the person she wants to associate to a MAC address
and keeps collecting probe request frames from the environment.
In [15], the authors propose a system that exploits a limitation of
Wi-Fi-based Positioning Systems (WPSs) in order to spoof the geolo-
cation of the user. This spoofed geolocation is then used as a side-
channel information source to establish the link between a Wi-Fi MAC
address and the user’s proﬁle on a geotagged service like FourSquare,
Facebook and others.
In [13] a system of cameras is used together with passive WiFi
probes to de-anonymize MAC address. Namely, the authors show how
positioning information extracted from the RSSI of received probe re-
quest messages can be coupled with positioning information extracted
from a system of cameras, such that a person which is captured on an
image can be mapped to a MAC address which is collected through
probe requests.
The authors of [17] propose a de-anonymizing system for probe
request messages. The proposed solution is able to infer the geo-
graphical provenience of the users generating probe request messages
by looking at the BSSID advertised in broadcast probe requests and
querying an external geo-localization service for WiFi hotspots
(Wigle1).
Chernyshev et al. [16] look at information that can be extracted
from the SSID strings contained in probe request messages. The as-
sumption is that the entities of potential interest, such as locations and
personal names contained within SSIDs, can be recognized in an auto-
mated fashion; the authors show that the attributes which can be ex-
tracted from the SSIDs can be used as a basis for inference attacks.
2.3. Users/device proﬁling
The work belonging to this class generally aims at extracting fea-
tures of the device generating the probe request and/or of the owners of
such devices. Cunche et al. study in [22] and later in [23] the possibility
of extracting social relationships between individuals by analyzing the
similarity of their probe request packets. The authors ﬁrst deﬁne a set of
features related to the probe request messages which constitute a ﬁn-
gerprint, and then measure the similarity of ﬁngerprint couples. Dif-
ferent similarity measures and feature compositions are considered.
Along the same lines, the authors of [25] show how SSIDs captured in
probe request packets can be used to infer known business venues.
Cheng et al. show in [21] how to detect relationships among users
by parsing the PNL inside probe request messages and resorting to
Wigle for geo-localizing APs.
After performing a collection campaign of probe requests lasted
about 3 months and targeting events of International, National, and
Citywide relevance, the authors of [24] focus on discovering social-
related phenomena like: the distribution of languages of the people
participating in the events, the vendors of the devices they use, and,
based on the cost of the diﬀerent brands, give insights on the wealth of
the population.
In [18], a non-intrusive Wi-Fi sniﬃng system is proposed to proﬁle
the users in oﬃce environments. The authors assign to each MAC a set
of features extracted from the generated WiFi traﬃc; such features in-
clude the dwell time of a given MAC in the system and the probing
frequency. A non-supervised clustering technique is then applied to ﬁnd
patterns in the behavior of diﬀerent individuals.
A similar approach is carried out in [19] which focuses on proﬁling
end users in university campuses. The proposed system leverages a
supervised learning approach which is able to classify users per usage
groups (short stay, long stay, etc.)
Diﬀerent than the previous work which targets the proﬁling of end
users, the authors of [20] focus on the proﬁling of WiFi devices. The
proposed study analyzes several packet capture conﬁgurations (e.g.,
antennas and network interfaces) and characterizes the behavior of
diﬀerent devices (hardware/software conﬁguration) with respect to the
emission process of probe requests.
3. System set up and data preprocessing
3.1. System set up
The data collection system to capture over the air probe request
messages consists of Raspberry Pi 3 nodes running Jessy OS and further
equipped with a TP-Link TL-WN725N WiFi dongle tuned to WiFi
channel number 1; Each node runs a t-shark (the terminal version of
WireShark) script to capture only probe request frames. The informa-
tion which is collected by the probing system is polished (by elim-
inating corrupted packet captures and eliding all the packet ﬁelds
which are useless) and ﬁnally stored to a MySQL database for further
analysis.
Each probe request message that is retained for database insertion
includes the following ﬁelds:
• the source MAC address (src),
• the Organizationally Unique Identiﬁer - OUI which identiﬁes the
radio chip vendor;
• the Service Set Identiﬁer (SSID) of the probe request which can be
either “Broadcast” or a string containing the SSID of a Wi-Fi network
known to the device.
• the id of the Raspberry receiving the probe request;1 https://wigle.net
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• the received signal strength indicator (rssi) out of the received probe
request;
• the timestamp of the reception event (rs);
• the sequence number (sn) of the probe request message.
The aforementioned probing hardware is used to build up three
diﬀerent datasets:
• LabLife dataset: six probing devices are deployed on the walls of our
research lab which has a surface of 80 m2 (see Fig. 2(a)); the six
anchor nodes, which are time-synchronized through NTP protocol,
store the traﬃc ﬁles locally and then send them to a central server
periodically (every hour) leveraging wired Ethernet connectivity.
This dataset includes about 11 millions entries referring to a col-
lection period of four weeks, and it is used to perform localization
and user proﬁling.
• FieraMilano dataset: the same setup of the LabLife dataset is deployed
at FieraMilano, an area devoted to public exhibitions in the city of
Milan. The experimental area consists of a 1296m2 indoor space and
the six probing devices are arranged in the same conﬁguration as the
LabLife dataset ((see Fig. 2(b))). Wi-Fi probe requests from visitors of
an exhibition were collected for ﬁve days from Monday to Friday. In
total, more than 2 millions probes were collected.
• Lectures dataset: For what concerns device classiﬁcation, a single
probing devices is used to gather probe request frames generated
during particular university classes (“tutorials” and “hands-on”
lectures) where students have their own laptops and smartphones
with them. At the beginning of the lecture, students are asked to (i)
turn on the Wi-Fi interfaces of their devices and (ii) compile an
anonymous form and insert the MAC addresses of their smartphones
and laptops to serve as ground truth. In addition to those entries
whose MAC addresses are labeled by students as belonging to either
the “laptop” or “mobile”, we also add to the database all those probe
request frames from device manufactured by a laptop-only or mo-
bile-only producer. The manufacturer is identiﬁed from the ﬁrst 3
octets of the MAC address (the so-called Organizationally Unique
Identiﬁer - OUI). In detail, probe request frames from Intel and
Liteon devices are automatically marked as coming from laptops,
while probe requests from Huawei, Nokia, Sony Mobile, Xiaomi and
onePlus are labeled as “mobile”. In total, the database consists of
more than 2×105 diﬀerent probe request entries, spanning 10
diﬀerent hours over 5 days and belonging to 279 diﬀerent devices of
known type.
3.2. Data pre-processing and lessons learned
a) MAC randomization: In response to the possibility of easily capturing
probe request frames, most operating systems for smartphones and
laptops have now implemented diﬀerent variants of MAC address
randomization in order to protect the privacy of the users. The in-
cidence of such eﬀect is considerable in the reference datasets: out
of 231442 unique MAC addresses detected in the LabLife and
Lectures dataset, only 90937 (approx 39%) of the MAC addresses has
a valid, registered OUI. We deduct that the remaining MAC ad-
dresses, which do not have a valid OUI, are therefore randomized by
the speciﬁc operative systems.
b) Unicast probe request: Unicast probe request messages are a minority:
only 25% of probe request messages of the datasets do notify any
SSID, and only 20% of the detected MAC addresses does advertise
any SSID at all. Fig. 3 report the cumulative distribution of the
number of SSIDs advertised by MAC addresses advertising at least
one SSID. As clear from the ﬁgure, 60% of probe request which
advertise at least one SSID does advertise only one SSID.
c) Temporal analysis: The probe request traﬃc stored in the LabLife
dataset features the traditional periodic behavior of any tele-
communication network traﬃc following classical daily and weekly
periodicity. Fig. 4 shows the number of detected probes in a single
day (Fig. 4a) and over a month (Fig. 4b) (note the drop in traﬃc due
to the Italian national holiday on the 25th of April and the lack of
data due to a power outage on May the ﬁrst).
d) Inter-probing time: Other works in the literature observe that the
Fig. 2. Reference environments for (a) Lablife dataset and (b) FieraMilano dataset. For Lablife, the 80m2 area is divided into 80 1m × 1m cells. For FieraMilano, the selected area is
divided in 36 6m×6m cells. Solids represent furniture, desks and other obstacles, localization cells are reported in dashed lines and solid circles report the position of the six anchor
nodes collecting probe requests.
Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution function of the number of SSID by a speciﬁc MAC address.
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average probe request emission frequency for idle terminals is in the
range of one probe every 2–5 minutes. A similar behavior has been
observed also in our datasets. Table 2 reports the mean and standard
deviation of the emission period for three diﬀerent devices (dis-
tinguished per vendor) in idle mode which have been monitored for
a total period of 8 hours.
It is worth observing here that the speciﬁc characteristics of the
probe request generation process are extremely device- and user-de-
pendent. Each device (hardware/software combination) emits probe
request according to its own internal rules and optimizations. We will
show how this distinctive behaviour can be leveraged to classify the
device type in Section 4.3.
4. Extracting information from passive traﬃc
We focus on three possible types of information which can be in-
ferred by looking at probe request traﬃc; namely we report on the use
and performance of probe-based localization systems (Section 4.1),
probe-based users proﬁling algorithms (Section 4.2), and probe-based
automatic classiﬁcation of end devices (Section 4.3).
4.1. Device localization
We compare hereafter two well known localization approaches
which leverage the received signal strength of wireless transmissions:
model-based parametric localization and ﬁngerprinting localization; the
ﬁrst, postulates the existence of a model function which relates the
received power to the distance travelled by the electromagnetic signal;
once the model is known/estimated, the terminal-anchor(s) distance
can be calculated out of the received power, and the estimated position
of the terminal is ﬁnally obtained through trilateration.
Diﬀerently, ﬁngerprinting localization builds on the assumption that
any position in the reference environment is characterized by a dis-
tinctive “ﬁngerprint”, deﬁned as the vector of RSSIs values at the
anchor nodes corresponding to a probe request transmission performed
at that very position. The localization process is composed of two dis-
tinct phases: in the training phase, the reference environment is sam-
pled at given positions and a database is populated with lines con-
taining the sampled position (cell id), and the RSSIs values received at
all the anchor nodes out of probe requests transmitted from the sampled
position. Once the database is populated, localization is performed in
the online phase: the ﬁngerprint coming from an unknown position is
matched to all the entries in the database to ﬁnd the closest match, and
hence the closest position. Diﬀerent ﬁngerprint matching algorithms
can be used to perform the database search, from the simple nearest
neighbour search to advanced machine learning algorithms such as
decision tree and random forest.
For what concerns the LabLife dataset, the reference area is dis-
cretized in 1[m2] cells, for a total of 80 cells. As for the FieraMilano
dataset, the 1296m2 area is divided in a 6×6 grid with squared cells of
36m2 For each cell, several probe request frames emitted by a WiFi-
enabled smartphone are collected at the six capturing devices. Note that
each probe request frame has a unique sequence number, making it
possible to identify a single probe request frames (and the corre-
sponding RSSI) on the diﬀerent capturing devices. To stimulate the
emission of probe request frames from the smartphone, we use the
built-in Wi-Fi management app to continuously refresh the list of
available networks. For each cell, one minute of probe request frames is
captured and labeled with the center coordinates of the cell xi . Data
from the six diﬀerent capturing devices is then merged into a single
dataset of 3200 entries for the LabLife dataset and 1400 entries for the
FieraMilano (about 40 entries per cell), where each entry has the form
(x ,i RSSI …, ,1 RSSI6) and RSSIj is the received signal strength at the j-th
capturing device. Each labeled dataset is then split into a training da-
taset, composed of 80% of each database entries, and a evaluation da-
taset, composed of the remaining 20% entries.
4.1.1. Model-based localization
In model-based parametric localization, the following reference pro-
pagation model is used:







where RSSI is the received signal strength indicator, p0 is the received
power at a reference distance of d0 from the transmitter, and α is the
path loss index.
The model parameters are empirically estimated for the test en-
vironment through an exhaustive measurement campaign. Namely, for
all the possible combinations of parameters p0 and α, the position of the
Fig. 4. Number of detected probe requests in a reference day per hour (a) and in a reference month per day (b).
Table 2
Mean and standard deviation of the inter-probing time.
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reference user, that is the vector coordinates of the cell the user lives in,












where yi is the position vector for the i-th probe element, and θi is a














The parameters of the propagation model deﬁned in Eq. (1) and the
normalization parameter γ are then set to P ,opt0 αopt and γopt which
minimize the average mean square localization error of Eq. (2) for all
the positions in the training dataset.
The localization precision is then tested on the evaluation dataset by
applying the propagation model Eq. (1) with the optimal parameters set
and solving Eq. (2).
4.1.2. Fingerprint-based localization
As explained before, the set of possible locations to be returned as
an estimate is discrete (the 80 or 36 cells of the reference area for the
LabLife or FieraMilano dataset, respectively). Therefore, it is possible to
tackle the localization problem as a classiﬁcation problem, where each
location corresponds to a diﬀerent class. A classiﬁcation algorithm
takes as input the set of RSSIs from the unknown position and returns
the most probable location (class) for that input. Three diﬀerent clas-
siﬁer are compared in this work:
• k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN): when =k 1 this simple classiﬁcation
algorithm assigns as output the cell corresponding to the nearest
ﬁngerprint in the training dataset. When k>1, the algorithms re-
turn the most occurring cell among the k nearest neighbour ﬁn-
gerprints. Euclidean distance is used to compute distance measure-
ments between the test and training ﬁngerprints.
• Naïve Bayes (NB): this algorithm assigns to the ﬁngerprint s a
probability value P(T|s), computed using the Bayes Theorem and
assuming that features are independent, that is:
∏= =P T P T P TP P T P s Ts s s( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ),i i (3)
where si denotes the i-th RSSI component of s and the denominator P
(s) can be ignored as it is the same for all classes. In the training
phase, the Naïve Bayes classiﬁer learns P(si|T) by ﬁtting Gaussian
probability distributions to each individual feature. In the test
phase, given a newly observed ﬁngerprint s, the NB classiﬁer returns
the most probable class, that is the class T for which P(T|s) is
maximized.
• Random forest (RF): this is an ensemble algorithm that has been
shown to perform very well in several machine learning and data
analysis tasks. A random forest classiﬁer constructs several decision
trees at training time, and outputs as a prediction the mode of the
classes predicted by the individual trees (majority voting). The in-
dividual trees are obtained selecting each time a random training
sample in order to decrease model variance (i.e. overﬁtting) and a
random subset of the input features to produce weakly correlated
trees.
4.1.3. Comparing localization systems
Figs. 5 and 6 report the cumulative distribution function of the lo-
calization error calculated on the LabLife and FieraMilano test dataset,
respectively. Both ﬁgures report the performance obtained with (a) four
anchor nodes and (b) six anchor nodes. In case of four anchors, only the
data received from the capturing devices placed at the four corners of
the reference environment (see e.g., Fig. 2) is used. Table 3 reports the
mean localization errors for the diﬀerent conﬁgurations tested. More-
over, we included in Table 3 the mean localization errors reported by
the works in [6] and [8], both using ﬁngerprinting localization, as a
benchmark. Three main considerations can be made from the inspec-
tion of such results:
1) Overall, the accuracy of ﬁngerprinting methods is higher than that
achieved with model-based localization. This is visible comparing
the value of the oﬀset of the diﬀerent CDFs (that is the percentage of
times the system retrieved the correct cell in the grid). For the
LabLife dataset with 4 anchor nodes, ﬁngerprinting allows to re-
trieve the correct cell 30% of the times, while the accuracy of model-
based localization is only 5%. When using 6 anchor nodes, the ac-
curacy increases to 43% for ﬁngerprinting and to 10% for model-
based localization. The same consideration can be made when
considering the mean localization errors shown in Table 3. When
considering the 80th percentile, however, the two localization
methods have similar performance.
2) Among the diﬀerent ﬁngerprint algorithms tested, the Random
Forest algorithm always achieves the best results. This is clearly
visible from the inspection of the CDFs, but also considering the
results in Table 3. In particular, when comparing our results for the
LabLife dataset with the ones reported in [6] or [8], the Random
Forest algorithm allows to obtain a comparable or smaller error
even with a smaller density of probing devices.
3) Overall, regardless of the localization algorithm used, the localiza-
tion error depends on how many probing devices are installed in the
reference area. Considering that the hardware setup used in this
work is extremely simple and cheap (less than 50 USD per probing
device), accurate passive localization is practically feasible in many
scenarios.
4.2. User proﬁling
Besides being used for localization, probe requests can be leveraged
to proﬁle the users within the reference environment. We start from the
observation that the population mix of the area under analysis is
composed of diﬀerent kinds of people. For what concerns the LabLife
dataset, the research lab is visited by faculty, PhD and master students,
visitors and passers-by. As for the FieraMilano dataset, the area is
chracterized by the presence of visitors of the exhibition, staﬀ and se-
curity personnel. In addition, visitors had the possibility of purchasing
diﬀerent tickets (1-day, 3-days and 5-days) for accessing the exhibition
All these classes of users are in general diﬀerent by return and sojourn
time in the areas under analysis, which, in turn, can be captured by a
speciﬁc “footprint” in the probe request emission. In particular, the
return time of a user is captured using the inter-probe period distribution
as basic feature. The construction of such a feature follows these steps:
• All timestamps ti of the Ns captured probe request frames belonging
to a single MAC address are sorted in chronological increasing order
in an array = …t t tT [ , , , ]N1 2 s .
• The diﬀerential vector = − − … − −t t t t t tP [ , , , ]N N2 1 3 2 1s s is con-
structed and thresholded so that all diﬀerences lower than 15
minutes are removed. This enables to capture only those time dif-
ferences caused by an actual return of the user, ﬁltering out those
entries caused by the natural behaviour of the probe request emis-
sion process controlled by the operating system of the speciﬁc de-
vice.
• A histogram is created grouping all time diﬀerences in 5 diﬀerent
bins, whose limits are created empirically considering the natural
behavior of a the user under consideration. For the LabLife dataset,
the ﬁrst bin captures all returns between 15 minutes and 3 hours,
which correspond to users leaving from and coming back to the lab
for a short time (e.g., lunch break). The second bin includes those
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returns between 10 and 19 hours, which correspond to the daily
return of users during the working week. The third bin contains time
diﬀerences between 34 and 50 hours, which corresponds to a day-
oﬀ from work. The fourth bin captures returns between 58 and 65
hours, which roughly correspond to users coming back after a 2-day
break (weekend). Finally, the last bin captures all those returns
greater than 65 hours. As for the FieraMilano dataset, considering
that data acquisition was performed for ﬁve days (from Monday to
Friday) we removed the last bin of the histogram.
• The resulting histogram is then normalized to unity and thresholded
so that all entries below 0.01 are set to zero and the remaining one
are set to 1. For the FieraMilano dataset, ﬁve additional binary
features bi are added, where =b 1i if the MAC address is present in
the database for i days and 0 otherwise. The resulting 5-dimensional
vector (for the LabLife dataset) or 9-dimensional binary vectors (for
the FieraMilano dataset), are used as ﬁngerprint for characterizing a
user. The entire process is summarized in Fig. 8 for the LabLife da-
taset.
4.2.1. Clustering the LabLife dataset
It is reasonable to expect diﬀerent inter-probe period distributions
for diﬀerent users of the lab. As an example, the binary feature vector of
a PhD students working regularly in the lab (shown in Fig. 8(c)) is
characterized by the ﬁrst four entries equal to one. Conversely, the
feature vector of a user which visited the lab once for a few hours and
never returned has only the ﬁrst entry diﬀerent from zero. At the same
time, users having similar behaviours in visiting the lab will have
similar feature vectors.
To identify such groups of users, we apply k-medoids clustering on
the feature data using Hamming distance as similarity metric.
Since the number of cluster k is not known a-priori, we run k-me-
doids with k from 1 to 10 and we study the corresponding total within-
cluster sum of squares distances. The result is illustrated in Fig. 7: one
should locate a kink in the sum of squares curve to identify the optimal
number of clusters (the so called elbow rule). According to Fig. 7 we set
k equal to 2 in our case: the resulting cluster centers are the two feature
vectors [1 0 0 0 0] and [1 1 0 1 0]. As one can see, the ﬁrst cluster is
Fig. 5. Cumulative distribution function of the localization error for the LabLife dataset when using four (a) and six (b) anchor nodes.













[6] 12 340 0.035 Fingerprint
(kNN)
4.5
[8] 4 30 0.133 Fingerprint
(NB)
2
LabLife 4 80 0.05 Fingerprint (RF) 2.06
LabLife 4 80 0.05 Model-based 2.3
LabLife 6 80 0.075 Fingerprint (RF) 1.5
LabLife 6 80 0.075 Model-based 1.9
FieraMilano 4 1296 0.003 Fingerprint (RF) 6.9
FieraMilano 4 1296 0.003 Model-based 7.8
FieraMilano 6 1296 0.005 Fingerprint (RF) 6
FieraMilano 6 1296 0.005 Model-based 6.7
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identiﬁed by users which are detected for a short period of time (the
ﬁrst bin is present), but never return. We denote this ﬁrst cluster as the
group of passers-by users. Conversely, the second cluster is represented
by users characterized by the peaks corresponding to daily and week-
ends returns, a behavior typical of people working in the lab. Therefore,
we denote the second cluster as the group of workers. Interestingly, 73%
of the MAC address in the dataset are labeled as passers-by, while only
27% are labeled as workers. This could be explained considering that
the lab is closely located to a public park and a pedestrian footway:
therefore, many of the captured probe requests may easily be coming
from devices belonging to people not related to the lab whatsoever. To
further analyze the results of the clustering operation, we conducted a
survey asking the MAC addresses of the devices belonging to people
working in the lab and in the closest rooms. In the survey, each parti-
cipant could also indicate a measure of attendance to the lab in the set
“mostly every day”, “mostly once per week” or “rarely”. The survey
resulted in the collection of 53 MAC addresses: 41 participants in-
dicated a daily presence, 10 a weekly presence and 2 indicated a rare
presence. Such data is used as ground-truth for evaluating the perfor-
mance of clustering. As a ﬁrst result, all 53 MAC addresses classiﬁed as
workers by the k-medoid algorithm. To further analyze the performance
of clustering, we run again k-medoids only on the subset of MAC ad-
dresses that participated to the survey. This time we ﬁxed the number
of clusters to 3: the resulting cluster centers are [1 1 0 1 0], [1 0 1 1 0]
and [1 0 0 1 1]. Table 4 shows how the diﬀerent MAC addresses in the
survey where labeled by the clustering algorithm: the ﬁrst cluster is
again capturing workers of the lab, characterized by daily and weekly
returns. In fact, 93% of the MAC addresses belonging to users that
answered “mostly every day” are belonging to this cluster. The second
cluster is characterised by returns corresponding to a day-oﬀ or a
weekend break, and 80% of the users that answered “mostly once per
week” are captured in this cluster. Finally, the users which answered
“rarely” are clustered together in the third cluster, which lacks short-
time returns completely.
4.2.2. Clustering the FieraMilano dataset
We repeated the clustering process also for the 40,223 MAC ad-
dresses with valid OUI (i.e., non randomized) contained in he
FieraMilano dataset, each one represented as a 9-dimensional binary
feature vectors. We run k-medoids with diﬀerent k-values and analyse
the within-cluster sum of squares curve: in this case the kink is observed
for k= 3, and the corresponding clusters centers are [1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0],
[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0] and [1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1]. The ﬁrst cluster corresponds
to people who visited the exhibition for only one day and never re-
turned. The second cluster corresponds to people who visited the ex-
hibitions for three days and the last cluster corresponds to people whose
device were recorded for all ﬁve days. Given the particular scenario
under consideration, it was not possible to perform any survey asking
for MAC addresses. Therefore, to quantify the performance of the
method, we rely on the statistics provided by the administration after
the exhibition. According to such statistics, 65,237 visitors were ad-
mitted to the exhibition. Among them, 24% owned a 1-day ticket, 73%
a 3-day ticket and 3% a 5-day ticket. In addition about 1000 staﬀ and
security personnel were present in the area during the ﬁve days of the
exhibition (whose pattern is assumed to be similar to the one belonging
to 5-day tickets owners). Table 5 reports the distribution of MAC ad-
dresses among the three clusters identiﬁed by the proposed algorithm
compared to the ground truth data obtained from the statistics. As one
can see, the two distributions are very close one to another, conﬁrming
the validity of the proposed approach. The discrepancy in the absolute
numbers can be attributed to the fact that not all visitors had the Wi-Fi
interface of their devices turned on or that their devices transmitted
probe requests with a randomized MAC address. Note also that the
proposed approach allows to tune the period of times chosen to build
the histogram bins, therefore opening up to applications in several
other scenarios where users are characterized by diﬀerent time-de-
pendent dynamics.
Fig. 7. Total within-cluster sum of squares distances vs. number of clusters. Applying the
elbow rule results in select k=2 as the optimal number of clusters.
Fig. 8. Creation of the binary feature vector for a speciﬁc MAC address. (a) The inter-probe period distribution is created (b) The distribution is quantized in 5 bins corresponding to the
natural activity of the users (c) The bins are thresholded and binarized.
Table 4
Clustering results on the LabLife dataset.
Every Day (41) Once per Week (10) Rarely (2)
Cluster 1: [1 1 0 1 0] 38 (93%) 2 (20%) 0
Cluster 2: [1 0 1 1 0] 3 (7%) 8 (80%) 0
Cluster 3: [1 0 0 0 1] 0 0 2 (100%)
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4.3. Smartphone/Laptop classiﬁcation
In this section we show how to use probe requests to classify whe-
ther a user device is a mobile handheld device (e.g., smartphone) or a
non handheld device (laptop). It is already well known that these two
device classes produce very diﬀerent traﬃc patterns, which impact on
the network performance in diﬀerent ways. Therefore, understanding
whether a device belongs to one or the other class is of key importance
for at least two reasons:
• Network traﬃc analysis: although the main characteristics of the
traﬃc patterns produced by handheld and non handheld devices
have already been studied in the past, the advent of new technolo-
gies, trends and applications may change such characteristics sig-
niﬁcantly. Therefore such analysis must be repeated from time to
time with the objective of identifying potential important changes in
how the two classes of devices diﬀer [27–30]. Clearly, this operation
calls for automatic methods able to classify traﬃc ﬂows as belonging
to one or the other class.
• Network management and optimization: related to the previous point,
the ﬁndings stemming from traﬃc analysis reveal important in-
formation that can be used to implement managing and optimiza-
tion tools for the entire network. Examples includes customized
traﬃc shaping policies [31], smart content caching approaches
[32], management of wide WiFi networks [33,34] and server pro-
visioning [35].
Diﬀerent approaches to perform device classiﬁcation are available
in the literature. A trivial and inexpensive method is to perform device
classiﬁcation by relying solely on the ﬁrst 3 octets of a MAC address,
known as the Organizationally Unique Identiﬁer (OUI), which identiﬁes
uniquely the manufacturer of a device [28,29]. The method works for
those manufacturers who make only smartphones (e.g., HTC, Rim,
Nokia) or laptops (e.g., Asus, Dell). Unfortunately, most of the devices
used nowadays are produced by manufacturers which produce both
types of devices (e.g., Samsung, Apple): therefore such a method can be
used only on a very small percentage of devices. To overcome this issue,
two alternative methods are generally used in the literature, both re-
sorting to traﬃc inspection tools which “read inside” application-layer
traﬃc: DHCP ﬁngerprinting [34] and inspection of the User Agent ﬁeld
of HTTP headers [27,30,33,35,36]. Unfortunately, both methods have
two major drawbacks: ﬁrst, they require the use of dedicated hardware
(e.g., Deep Packet Inspectors) or software licenses (e.g., Cisco Identity
Services Engine) on the existing network architecture, which might not
be always possible due to high costs and administrative, management
or privacy issues. Moreover, even when the installation of packet in-
spection devices is possible, the increase in encrypted traﬃc makes it
hard to extract useful information out of such tools. It’s a matter of fact
that web giants (Google, Amazon, Facebook, etc.) protect the traﬃc
through their servers with HTTPS: as an example, a recent transparency
report from Google [37] stated that 77% of the requests to its servers
used encrypted connections, with such percentage destined to increase
dramatically in the next few years. Such a trend imposes tight limits on
the use of those methods based on the inspection of application layer
information such as the User-Agent header ﬁeld, which is encrypted in
HTTPS and thus hard or even impossible to analyze. In contrast to such
approaches, we show that the very same task of device classiﬁcation
can be performed in a less intrusive and expensive way by passively
analyzing probe requests traﬃc.
The key tenet of this approach is that the probe traﬃc generated by
diﬀerent classes of devices is homogeneous/similar in the same class.
For the classiﬁcation task at hand, we focus on the following set of
features:
• Inter-Probe Period (IPP): diﬀerent devices do transmit probe requests
with diﬀerent temporal frequencies; moreover, the probing pattern
of mobile devices is extremely status-dependant; as an example, the
probing frequency is generally decreased when the screen is turned
oﬀ, and each time a user presses a button or unblocks the phone a
new probe request is transmitted. We attempt to capture those be-
haviours with two speciﬁc features. In particular, all timestamps ti of
the probe request frames belonging to a single MAC address are
extracted and sorted in chronological increasing order in an array
= …t t tT [ , , , ]N1 2 s . Let = −+p t ti i i1 be the i-th inter-probe period. We














Similarly, we deﬁne the standard deviation of the inter-probe period
as:
Table 5
Clustering results on the FieraMilano dataset.
Estimation Oﬃcial Statistics
Cluster 1: [1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0] 8203 (21%) 15,627 (23.5%)
Cluster 2: [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0] 30,442 (76%) 47,623 (72%)
Cluster 3: [1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1] 1578 (3%) 2957 (4.5%)
TOTAL 40,223 66,237
Fig. 9. (a) CDF of the inter-probe period for laptops and mobile devices; (b) CDF of the standard deviation of the RSS for laptops and mobile devices; (c) CDF of the inter-probe period for
mobile devices of diﬀerent vendors (best viewed in color).
Table 6
Classiﬁcation accuracy using only dummy features.
Algorithm Accuracy
Naive Bayes 0.8029
Support Vector Machine 0.7957
Decision Tree 0.778
Random Forest 0.8129
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Fig. 9(a) shows the Cumulative Distribution Function of the average
inter-probe period for laptops and mobile devices. We can observe
that laptop devices probe more frequently than smartphones: 50% of
all laptops have an inter-probe period of less than 60 seconds, and
95% of them have an IPP of less than 1000 seconds. The IPP for the
same percentages of smartphones are considerably higher, 120
seconds and 2300 seconds, respectively.
• Received Signal Strength (RSS): The received signal strength measures
the power of a probe request as seen from the receiver and depends
on the distance between the transmitter and the receiver as well as
on other eﬀects characterizing the radio environment (presence of
obstacles, mutual antenna orientations, etc.). Similarly to the IPP,
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that is, the average and standard deviation of the RSS of the cap-
tured probe request frames. The reason behind the use of such two
features is the following: we posit that handheld devices exhibit a
higher variance in the RSS compared to non-handheld devices.
Indeed, smartphones and tablets are more frequently handled and
moved than laptops, creating ﬂuctuations in the RSS measurements
captured by σr, s. Such diﬀerence is clearly illustrated in Fig. 9(b): as
one can see, 95% of the laptops in our dataset have standard de-
viation of the RSS lower than 5 dBm, while for mobile devices this
value is almost double.
• Coeﬃcients of variation: For both IPP and RSS features we also

















Such coeﬃcients are useful to provide a dimensionless feature and
to compare the degree of variation of measurements from diﬀerent
devices regardless of their mean value.
• Number of probe requests with broadcast/known SSID: For each source
MAC address s we store the number of probe request frames with a
“Broadcast” destination SSID Nb, s and the number of probe request
frames with a textual SSID (that is, the SSID of a Wi-Fi network to
which the device associated at least once) Nk, s. Note that
= +N N Ns b s k s, , . We also compute the proportion of broadcast and








, . Finally, we also
store the number of unique SSIDs contained in the probe request
frames, that is Nu, s.
• Device manufacturer: Several works in the past have exploited the
vendor information contained in the MAC address to infer the class
of a device ([28,29]). Given that some vendors produce only mobile
or laptop devices, it is reasonable to include the vendor as a feature
for classiﬁcation. We observe that the set of OUIs contained in the
database is limited to V diﬀerent vendors. At the same time, we
observe that devices from diﬀerent vendors have very diﬀerent
probing behaviors. As an example, Fig. 9(c) illustrates the CDF of the
inter-probe period for 5 diﬀerent vendors of mobile devices, with
Huawei and Sony devices having the smallest inter-probe period
while Apple devices have the largest one. To capture such diﬀer-
ences, we create −V 1 dummy binary variables … −d d d, , , ,s s V s1, 2, 1,
such that =d 1i s, if s is from the i-th vendor, and =d 0,i s, otherwise.
Note that the V-th vendor is identiﬁed by having all di, s equal to
zero.
In summary, each device in the Lectures database is represented with
the following feature feature vector:
= ⎧⎨⎩
… ⎫⎬⎭−








where we have suppressed the subscript s for simplicity. Finally, we
label each entry in the dataset with its ground truth class “Laptop” or
“Mobile”. After the feature extraction step, our dataset consists of 279
labeled entries belonging to 150 laptops and 129 mobile devices.
We aim at solving the following problem: given a feature vector f
belonging to a device of unknown type T (and computed through
processing of sniﬀed probe request frames, predict whether the device
is a laptop or a mobile device. We solve such a problem taking a su-
pervised learning approach: we use diﬀerent classiﬁer algorithms that
are trained with a set of labeled observations and are then evaluated on
a set of completely new observations. In particular, we test the fol-
lowing classiﬁcation algorithms:
• Naïve Bayes (NB): as previously mentioned, this algorithm learns P
(fi|T) by ﬁtting probability distributions to each individual feature:
for real valued features, normal (Gaussian) distributions are used,
while for binary features (e.g. d1 to −dV 1) binomial distributions are
used to model the data. The classiﬁer then returns the most probable
class, that is the class T for which P(T|f), computed using Bayes
Theorem, is maximized.
• Support Vector Machine (SVM): SVM classiﬁers are very popular
supervised algorithms that construct a hyperplane in the subspace of
features so that observation belonging to diﬀerent classes are
Fig. 10. (a) Classiﬁcation accuracy when using only quantitative features; (b) Classiﬁcation accuracy when using both quantitative and dummy features. (c) Number of training samples
at diﬀerent values of Ns. (best viewed in color).
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separated by a margin as wide as possible. In addition, when the
diﬀerent classes are not linearly separable, SVMs allows to perform
non-linear classiﬁcation eﬃciently by ﬁrst transforming the feature
space with a non-linear kernel function, and then constructing a
separating hyperplane in the transformed space.
• Decision tree (DT): a decision tree is a classiﬁcation algorithm that
returns the predicted class by iteratively making decisions on the
value of the input features. Decisions are learned with a training
process, starting with the most discriminative feature at the top
(root) of tree and iteratively aggregating decisions in branches, ﬁ-
nally arriving to the tree leaves (predicted classes). As a result, the
learned tree can be more easily interpreted than a SVM classiﬁer
(e.g., it can be displayed graphically). As a drawback, decision trees
generally do not have the same level of predictive accuracy as SVM,
due to their tendency to overﬁt the training data.
• Random Forest (RF): as explained before, this ensemble algorithm is
generally used to prevent overﬁtting when using decision trees, and
has been shown to perform very well in several machine learning
tasks. A random forest classiﬁer constructs several decision trees at
training time, and outputs as a prediction the mode of the classes
predicted by the individual trees (majority voting).
The performance of such classiﬁers are obtained resorting to k-fold
cross validation: ﬁrst, the original set of 279 observations in the Lectures
dataset is divided in k complementary subsets; then, −k 1 subsets are
used for training each classiﬁer, while one is used for testing. The
process is repeated k times, averaging the results. Here, we used =k 5.
The performance metric used throughout the tests is the classiﬁcation
accuracy, that is the fraction of correctly classiﬁed observations over the
total number of tests.
We test the performance of the diﬀerent classiﬁers in three diﬀerent
scenarios:
• Quantitative features only (QF): we consider only the numerical
features extracted from the database of probe requests, that is





b k for training and testing the
classiﬁers. This scenario reﬂects the case in which the OUI in-
formation of a device cannot be read. This can happen if the MAC
addresses of the devices are encrypted through randomization, a
solution that several vendors are gradually implementing in the
operating systems of their devices (e.g., iOS8, Android 6.0).
• Dummy features only (DF): conversely, we consider only the dummy
features obtained with the OUI information available from the MAC
address to perform classiﬁcation. This approach applies machine
learning techniques to the same information available to other ap-
proaches available in the literature [28,29].
• All features (AF): ﬁnally, in this scenario, we train and test the
classiﬁers using both quantitative and qualitative features.
Table 6 shows the classiﬁcation accuracy for the dummy features
scenario. As one can see, the diﬀerent classiﬁers have similar values of
accuracy, around 80%. Note, however, that this value strongly depends
on the distribution of device vendors in the dataset. As an example, if
the majority of the devices in the dataset is from a vendor that produces
both handheld and non handheld devices (e.g., Apple, Samsung), the
accuracy of such method is expected to decrease dramatically due to the
impossibility to link a vendor with a particular device class.
For the quantitative features and the all features scenarios, the tests
are performed considering only those samples belonging to devices
whose features are extracted starting from at least Ns probe request
frames, each time increasing the value of Ns. Such value as a twofold
eﬀect on the performance of the classiﬁers: on one hand, increasing Ns
allows to train the classiﬁers with more “stable” features, as those
features involving mean and standard deviation operation are com-
puted with an increasing set of samples. On the other hand, increasing
Ns makes the number of samples available for training the classiﬁers
decrease, as shown in Fig. 10(c). Note also that Ns is related to the
amount of time one should spend to capture probe request frames,
which increases with Ns.
Fig. 10(a) shows the classiﬁcation accuracy of the diﬀerent classi-
ﬁers when using only quantitative features. As one can see, the accu-
racy of all classiﬁer tends to increase for small values of Ns and de-
creases for high values of Ns. The ﬁrst eﬀect is due to the increasing
stability in the computed features, while the latter eﬀect is due to the
decreasing number of training observations, as explained above.
Overall, the Random Forest classiﬁer exhibits the best performance,
with a peak accuracy value of 83% for =N 15s . The performance of the
diﬀerent classiﬁers in the scenario where both quantitative and quali-
tative features are used is illustrated in Fig. 10(b). First, it is possible to
appreciate the great performance increase given by using both kind of
features. In this case, all methods but the Naive Bayes classiﬁer exhibit
similar performance, with the Random Forest classiﬁer correctly clas-
sifying more than 95% of the test samples. In this case, the positive
eﬀect of increasing Ns seems shadowed by the use of dummy features.
On the contrary, increasing Ns too much hurts the performance of all
classiﬁers, due to the decrease in the number of training samples.
5. Concluding remarks
We have addressed the issue of extracting as much information as
possible out of inexpensive hardware/software systems to passively
collect WiFi traﬃc. To this extent, we have analyzed real-life traﬃc
datasets and we have reported on the realization and performances of
three possible use cases/application of probe request-based data ana-
lytics: end user localization, end-user proﬁling and device classiﬁcation.
For the ﬁrst application, an average localization error of 1.5 m is ob-
tained using ﬁngerprint-based localization and 6 capturing devices
deployed in a 80[m2] area. For what concerns user proﬁling, we pro-
posed a set of features extracted from the capture time of probe request
frames to cluster users in groups based on their dwell time and pre-
sence. A comparison with a manually obtained ground truth demon-
strated the goodness of our approach. Finally, we showed that probe
request frames can be used to distinguish between smartphones and
laptop with very good accuracy.
It is worth to point out that the analysis carried out in this work
builds on clear probe request messages, that is, probe request messages
containing real MAC addresses; on the other hand, an increasing
number of devices is nowadays adopting MAC randomization techni-
ques to obfuscate the sender’s identity; even if these techniques in
principle make “less informative” the passive sniﬃng of WiFi control
frames, still probe request packets constitute a considerable source of
interesting information. In fact, recent studies [38] demonstrate that
randomized probe request still retain enough information entropy which
allows to extract similar knowledge as the one addressed in this work.
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